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UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL <i>(Only for new nonprovisional applications under 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b))</i>	Attorney Docket No.	N0065US
	First Inventor or Application Identifier	CHOUNACKI
	Title	Encryption Method for Distribution of Data
	Express Mail Label No.	EK 656528355US

APPLICATION ELEMENTS <i>See MPEP chapter 600 concerning utility patent application contents.</i>	ADDRESS TO: Assistant Commissioner for Patents Box Patent Application Washington, DC 20231
1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> * Fee Transmittal Form (e.g., PTO/SB/17) <i>(Submit an original and a duplicate for fee processing)</i>	5. <input type="checkbox"/> Microfiche Computer Program (Appendix)
2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Specification [Total Pages 60] <i>(preferred arrangement set forth below)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Descriptive title of the Invention - Cross References to Related Applications - Statement Regarding Fed sponsored R & D - Reference to Microfiche Appendix - Background of the Invention - Brief Summary of the Invention - Brief Description of the Drawings (if filed) - Detailed Description - Claim(s) - Abstract of the Disclosure 	6. Nucleotide and/or Amino Acid Sequence Submission <i>(if applicable, all necessary)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <input type="checkbox"/> Computer Readable Copy b. <input type="checkbox"/> Paper Copy (identical to computer copy) c. <input type="checkbox"/> Statement verifying identity of above copies
3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Drawing(s) (35 U.S.C. 113) [Total Sheets 13]	ACCOMPANYING APPLICATION PARTS
4. Oath or Declaration [Total Pages 2] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Newly executed (original or copy) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Copy from a prior application (37 C.F.R. § 1.63(d)) <i>(for continuation/divisional with Box 16 completed)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. <input type="checkbox"/> DELETION OF INVENTOR(S) Signed statement attached deleting inventor(s) named in the prior application, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63(d)(2) and 1.33(b). 	7. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Assignment Papers (cover sheet & document(s)) 8. <input type="checkbox"/> 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(b) Statement <input type="checkbox"/> Power of Attorney <i>(when there is an assignee)</i> 9. <input type="checkbox"/> English Translation Document (if applicable) 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement (IDS)/PTO-1449 <input type="checkbox"/> Copies of IDS Citations 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Preliminary Amendment 12. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Return Receipt Postcard (MPEP 503) <i>(Should be specifically itemized)</i> 13. <input type="checkbox"/> * Small Entity Statement(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Statement filed in prior application, Status still proper and desired (PTO/SB/09-12) 14. <input type="checkbox"/> Certified Copy of Priority Document(s) (if foreign priority is claimed) 15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other:

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17. CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

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1 ENCRYPTION METHOD FOR DISTRIBUTION OF DATA

2 INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE

3 This specification is filed contemporaneously with two other U.S. patent applications,
4 entitled respectively "Method and System for Mass Distribution of Geographic Data for Navigation
5 Systems" and "Navigation System with Decryption Functions and Secure Geographic Database,"
6 each by the same inventor as the present invention, and each assigned to the owner of the present
7 invention. The entirety of each of these other applications is hereby incorporated by reference.

8 This specification is also related to the subject matter of U.S. Patent No. 5,951,620 (the
9 '620 patent), which is entitled "System and Method for Distributing Information for Storage
10 Media," and which issued on September 14, 1999 to Navigation Technologies Corporation of
11 Rosemont, Illinois. The entirety of the '620 patent is also hereby incorporated by reference.

12 BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

13 1. **Field of the Invention**

14 The present invention relates to a system and method for secure distribution of digital
15 data to end users' media for use by the end users. More particularly, the present invention relates
16 to systems and methods for distributing geographic data to end users for use in their navigation
17 systems.
18 systems.

19 2. **Description of Related Art**

20 There are various different types of devices for which end users are required to obtain
21 digital data. One type of device for which end users are required to obtain digital data is a
22 navigation system. Navigation systems for use on land have become available in a variety of

1 forms and provide for a variety of useful features. One exemplary type of navigation system
2 uses (1) a geographic database that contains data representing features in a geographic area or
3 region, (2) a navigation application program, (3) appropriate computer hardware, such as a
4 microprocessor and memory, and, optionally, (4) a positioning system. The geographic database
5 portion of the navigation system includes information about the positions of roads and
6 intersections in or related to a specific geographic regional area, and may also include
7 information about attributes, such as one-way streets and turn restrictions, as well as about street
8 addresses, alternative routes, hotels, restaurants, museums, stadiums, offices, automobile
9 dealerships, auto repair shops, etc.

10 The positioning system may employ any of several well-known technologies to
11 determine or approximate one's physical location in a geographic regional area. For example, the
12 positioning system may employ a GPS-type system (global positioning system), a "dead
13 reckoning"-type system, or combinations of these, or other systems, all of which are well-known
14 in the art.

15 The navigation application program portion of the navigation system is typically a
16 software program that uses data from the geographic database and the positioning system (when
17 employed). The navigation application program may provide the user with a graphical display
18 (e.g. a "map") of his specific location in the geographic area. In addition, the navigation
19 application program may also provide the user with specific directions to locations in the
20 geographic area from wherever he is located.

21 The geographic data used by a navigation system may be stored locally with the
22 navigation system in the vehicle, or, alternatively, the geographic data may be located remotely
23 and downloaded to the navigation application programs, as needed, via a wireless

1 communications system or other suitable communications channel. An advantage associated
2 with having the geographic data stored locally with the navigation system is that a large amount
3 of data is continuously available to the navigation system, thereby avoiding the costs associated
4 with installing and maintaining a communications infrastructure that affords the necessary
5 bandwidth needed to provide the data from a remote site. On the other hand, a consideration
6 associated with storing geographic data locally with the navigation system is the need to update
7 the data on a regular basis.

8 Accordingly, there is a need for a system and method for the distribution of new and
9 updated geographic data to users of navigation systems.

10 Another consideration associated with providing geographic data for navigation systems
11 is the need to safeguard the data from unlicensed uses, e.g., illegal copying. The collection of
12 geographic data can be a relatively time-consuming and expensive process. Therefore, although
13 it is desirable to make it easy for users of navigation systems to obtain new and updated
14 geographic data, it is also desired to provide security measures that prevent unlicensed uses.

15 As mentioned above, there are various different types of devices for which end users are
16 required to obtain digital data. Other devices include music players (e.g., audio CD players,
17 MP3 players, as well as players that support other formats), video game consoles, DVD players,
18 and computers. The considerations relating to safeguarding of geographic data from unlicensed
19 uses also applies to data provided for these other types of devices.

20 21 SUMMARY

22 The present invention provides a method and system for securing data for mass
23 distribution. In accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the invention, an authorization

1 server may be coupled via a communications link with a plurality of data distribution terminals.
2 The authorization server may maintain at least a first portion of each of a plurality of data
3 products, such as geographic databases for instance. The first portion may define parameters
4 (such as compression parameters and pointers) to which a machine must have access in order to
5 be able to usefully access the data product. Each data distribution terminal may, in turn,
6 maintain the remainder (i.e., a second portion) of each of a plurality of the data products. Thus,
7 to establish a complete data product, the authorization server may provide the first portion to a
8 given data distribution terminal, and the data distribution terminal may combine the portions
9 together.

10 A person may visit one of the data distribution terminals to request a given data product
11 for use by a machine. The person may couple a portable data storage medium, such as a flash
12 memory card for instance, with the data distribution terminal, and the user may provide the
13 terminal with identification and payment information. The terminal may then request the first
14 portion of the data product from the authorization server, the authorization server may verify
15 authorization to provide the data product, and the authorization server may then send the first
16 portion to the terminal. The terminal may then combine the first and second portions together
17 and write the combined data product to the data storage medium. The person may then remove
18 the storage medium from the terminal and couple the storage device with the machine. The
19 machine may then read the data product from the storage medium and use the data product.

20 This arrangement is well suited for supplying data products of various sorts for use by
21 machines of various sorts. In an exemplary embodiment, the data products may be geographic
22 databases, for use by navigation systems (such as in-vehicle navigation systems, handheld
23 (portable) navigation systems, or general purpose computing devices equipped with navigation

1 system functionality). As other examples, the data products may be digitized songs or videos
2 (e.g., movies) for use by music or video players, or games for use by video game consoles.
3 Other examples are possible as well.

4 A data product that is to be mass distributed can be secured against unauthorized use,
5 while allowing the data to be stored on an authorized entity such as a particular data storage
6 medium for instance. To do so, in accordance with an exemplary embodiment, some or all of the
7 data product can be encrypted so as to produce encrypted data that can be decrypted using a first
8 cryptographic key. Further, an authorization key can be assembled, to include information that is
9 indicative of the authorized entity. The encrypted data and authorization key can then be stored
10 on the authorized entity.

11 In turn, a machine that has access to the first cryptographic key may be programmed to
12 use the authorization key to validate the data product, before accessing the data product. In
13 particular, by reference to the authorization key and the authorized entity, the machine may
14 ensure that the authorized entity is the entity indicated by the authorization key. If the data
15 product is copied to an unauthorized entity, and the machine seeks to read the data product from
16 the unauthorized entity, then the machine may thereby determine that the entity is unauthorized
17 and may be programmed to not access the data product.

18 To further secure the data, the authorization key can itself be encrypted to produce an
19 encrypted authorization key that can be decrypted using a second cryptographic key. In an
20 exemplary embodiment, the authorization key is symmetrically encrypted with the second
21 cryptographic key.

22 To still further secure the data, the second cryptographic key may be derived as a
23 function of an environmental parameter, such as an identification code associated with the

1 authorized entity for instance. In this way, if the data is copied to an unauthorized entity having
2 a different identification code, the machine may be unable to derive the second cryptographic
3 key and may therefore be unable to decrypt the authentication key. The machine may therefore
4 be precluded from accessing the data product.

5 In an exemplary embodiment, the authorization server may secure the first portion of the
6 data product in the manner described above and may send the first portion of the data product,
7 together with authorization parameters (e.g., an authorization key) for instance, to a data
8 distribution terminal. In this regard, the authorization server may receive from the data terminal
9 an indication of the authorized entity, such as an ID of the data storage medium that a person has
10 coupled with the data terminal. The data distribution terminal may then store on the data storage
11 medium the secured first portion, together with authorization parameters for instance, and the
12 second portion.

13 These and other objects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent to
14 those of ordinary skill in the art by reading the following detailed description, with appropriate
15 reference to the accompanying drawings.
16

17 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

18 Preferred embodiments of the present invention are described herein with reference to the
19 drawings, in which:

20 Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system arranged to facilitate mass distribution of
21 geographic data to one or more navigation systems in accordance with an exemplary
22 embodiment;

23 Figure 2 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary authorization server;

1 Figure 3 is a perspective view of an exemplary data storage device for holding secured
2 data;

3 Figure 4 is a block diagram depicting components of the data storage device of Figure 3;

4 Figure 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary data terminal;

5 Figure 6 is a database having a critical portion and a data portion;

6 Figure 7 is a block diagram of an exemplary navigation system;

7 Figure 8 is a flow chart depicting an exemplary process that may be performed in order to
8 provide a database of geographic data to portable data storage device;

9 Figure 9 is a flow chart depicting a set of functional blocks that may be involved in
10 securing and providing data to a navigation system in accordance with an exemplary
11 embodiment;

12 Figure 10 is a flow chart depicting a set of functional blocks that may be involved in
13 retrieval, decryption and validation of the data at the navigation system in accordance with an
14 exemplary embodiment;

15 Figure 11 is a flow chart illustrating a set of functional blocks that may be involved in an
16 enhanced process of securing, conveying and accessing data in accordance with an exemplary
17 embodiment;

18 Figure 12 is a flow chart illustrating a set of functional blocks that may be involved in
19 another enhanced process of securing, conveying and accessing data in accordance with an
20 exemplary embodiment; and

21 Figure 13 is a block diagram illustrating an alternative system arranged to facilitate mass
22 distribution of geographic data to one or more navigation systems in accordance with an
23 exemplary embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

A. Exemplary System Architecture

Referring to the drawings, Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary system 10 arranged to facilitate distribution of geographic data to one or more navigation systems 16. System 10 includes an authorization server 12 arranged to be connected by a communications link 18 to a plurality of data distribution terminals 20. Each data distribution terminal is then arranged to provide data to a distribution medium 22, which is, in turn, arranged to provide the data to a navigation system 16.

Communications link 18 can take any of a variety of forms and can include any number of intermediate entities arranged to convey data from one point to another. For example, link 18 can include or take the form of a telecommunications network including wireless communication interfaces (e.g., satellite, radio frequency (RF) cellular, or other interfaces) and/or landline communication interfaces (e.g., the ISDN, cable, fiber, copper, or other interfaces). As a specific example, link 18 may comprise the public switched telephone network. As another specific example, link 18 may comprise the Internet, to which authorization server 12 and each data distribution terminal can be connected by a broadband (e.g., cable or DSL) connection, point-to-point connection, or other suitable link.

Distribution medium 22 may take various forms as well and may vary from terminal to terminal and from navigation system to navigation system. For example, distribution medium 22 may comprise an RF communications link between a terminal 20 and a navigation system 16. As another example, distribution medium 22 may comprise a wired communication link between a terminal 20 and a navigation system 16.

1 In the exemplary embodiment, distribution medium 22 comprises a portable data storage
2 device, which can be selectively coupled to a distribution terminal 20 and to a navigation system
3 16. Thus, in operation, geographic data can be communicated from authorization server 12 over
4 link 18 to a data terminal 20. Data terminal 20 can then record data onto a portable data storage
5 device 22, which can then be physically carried to, or otherwise coupled with, a navigation
6 system 16. Navigation system 16 can then read the data from device 22 and use the data to
7 provide navigation services for a user.

8 This and other arrangements described herein are shown for purposes of illustration only,
9 and those skilled in the art will appreciate that other arrangements and other elements (e.g.,
10 machines, interfaces, functions, etc.) can be used instead, additional elements may be added, and
11 some elements may be omitted altogether. Further, those skilled in the art will appreciate that
12 many of the elements and interfaces described herein are functional entities that may be
13 implemented as discrete components or in conjunction with other components, in any suitable
14 combination and location.

15 It should also be understood that various functions described herein as being performed
16 by one or more entities may be carried out by one or more processors executing an appropriate
17 set of machine language instructions stored in memory. Provided with the present disclosure,
18 those skilled in the art can readily prepare and compile appropriate computer instructions to
19 perform such functions.

20 Referring now to Figure 2, an exemplary authorization server 12 is shown in greater
21 detail. Authorization server 12 may take the form of a general purpose computer programmed
22 with a set of machine language instructions to carry out the functions described below. As
23 shown in Figure 2, exemplary authorization server 12 may thus include a processor 26, a data

1 store 28, a memory 30 and a data interface unit 32. These components may be coupled together
2 by a system bus or other link to facilitate communication. And the components may take various
3 forms. By way of example, processor 26 may be an Intel Pentium III microprocessor, data store
4 28 may be a flash memory, ROM and/or magnetic or optical hard disk drive, memory 30 may be
5 volatile RAM (random access memory), and data interface unit 32 may comprise a transceiver,
6 modem, antenna and/or other arrangement suitable for communicating over link 18.

7 Although Figure 2 shows components of authorization server 12 within a single entity,
8 those skilled in the art will appreciate that various components could equally be provided as
9 separate entities. For example, all or part of data store 28 could be provided as a database server
10 with a separate processor that is accessible by processor 26 via a computer network or other link.

11 In an exemplary embodiment, data store 28 may hold three data components: (i)
12 geographic data 36, (ii) program logic 38, and (ii) authorization database 40. Geographic data 36
13 may comprise one or more databases or data files that define geographical data, such as road
14 geometry attributes and position information, and point-of-interest information. The road
15 geometry attribute and position information may include data about the positions (e.g., latitude
16 and longitude coordinates) of streets and intersections in or related to a specific geographical
17 area, information about one-way streets, street lights, stop signs, turn restrictions, street
18 addresses, speed limits, and the like. Point-of-interest information may include data about the
19 positions of airports, car rental agencies, service centers, restaurants, hotels, health clubs, and the
20 like. The geographical data may include other or different data as well.

21 Geographic data 36 may also include special databases of information. For example,
22 geographic data may include Fodor's® Restaurant Guide or other such information, which
23 authorization server 12 may provide together with a basic geographic database if desired.

1 Program logic 38 may comprise a number of machine language instructions that define
2 routines executable by processor 26. In operation, these instructions can be loaded from data
3 store 28 into memory 30 and then executed by processor 26 to carry out functions described
4 below, such as establishing authorization keys and encrypting authorization keys and geographic
5 data, for instance. Program logic 38 also includes an operating system (not shown), such as
6 Unix, Linux[®] or Microsoft Windows[®], for instance.

7 Authorization database 40 may include information that identifies entities authorized to
8 access and/or possess geographic data. The entities may be, for instance, a user, a navigation
9 system and/or a data storage device (such as a flash memory card or other flash memory
10 medium, for example). Thus, for example, a given user profile record may be keyed to a user ID
11 code and may indicate that (i) the user is authorized to obtain geographic data for a particular
12 geographical area, (ii) a navigation system with a particular navigation system ID code is
13 authorized to access and use the geographic data, and (iii) a storage device with a particular
14 storage device ID code is authorized to hold the geographic data.

15 Authorization database 40 may also define algorithms and keys that authorization server
16 12 may use to encrypt and/or otherwise secure geographic data. The process or keys used to
17 encrypt or otherwise secure data may vary depending on the make and model of the navigation
18 system that is expected to access the data, or depending on other factors. For instance, each
19 model navigation system may have a predetermined decryption key that can be used to decrypt
20 data encrypted using a corresponding encryption key and/or corresponding encryption algorithm.
21 More specifically, each model navigation system may have its own private/public key pair.
22 Authorization database 40 may therefore indicate, for each model navigation system, the
23 encryption key and/or algorithm to be used for securing data that will be accessed by that model

1 navigation system. (Data could be encrypted using a private key and then decrypted by the
2 navigation system using the corresponding public key, or vice versa.)

3 In practice, the geographic data that is stored in data store 28 will be updated regularly,
4 through a time consuming and costly process of surveying roads and points of interest and
5 collecting and compiling data. Consequently, authorization server 12, and particularly data store
6 28, is preferably maintained in a physically secure location, so as to guard against theft or
7 misappropriation of the geographic data. Authorization server 12 may be owned and operated by
8 a geographic data supply company, such as Navigation Technologies Corporation, of Rosemont,
9 Illinois, which provides geographic data for use in mapping and navigation systems.

10 As indicated above, geographic data can be recorded on portable data storage device 22,
11 which can then conveniently be provided to a navigation system 16. The storage device is
12 preferably portable (e.g., small and lightweight enough to carry), secure, nonvolatile, readable
13 and re-writeable. Further, the storage device preferably has sufficient storage capacity to hold
14 geographic data for a typical geographical area (such as a city, state, region, or any other sized
15 area). Still further, to be robust, the storage device is preferably arranged to hold data in an
16 appropriate format, such as the SDAL™ format available from Navigation Technologies
17 Corporation or that is described in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,968,109, 5,974,419, and 5,953,722.
18 However, storage device 22 can take other forms as well.

19 In an exemplary embodiment, portable data storage device 22 takes the form of a flash
20 memory card or PC card (PCMCIA card) with housing dimensions, interface dimensions and
21 data storage capacity that conform with industry standards, recommendations or specifications.
22 For example, if the storage device is a flash memory card, the device may conform with size and
23 capacity parameters conforming with SD Memory Card Specifications (available from the

1 Secure Digital Card Association of Palo Alto, California), which is well known to those skilled
2 in the art. Such cards currently have dimensions of about 31 mm x 24 mm x 2.1 mm and have
3 storage capacity of 32 megabytes or 64 megabytes of data. As another example, if the storage
4 device is a PCMCIA hard disk card, the device preferably conforms with the PCMCIA standard
5 (such as the PCMCIA Type III standard), which is well known to those skilled in the art. Such
6 PCMCIA cards have dimensions of about 85 mm x 54 mm x 5 mm and are presently capable of
7 storing about 440 megabytes of data.

8 Figures 3 and 4 illustrate an exemplary portable data storage device 22 in the form of an
9 SD-Card (e.g., a "SanDisk Secure Digital Memory Card," which is a flash memory card
10 manufactured by SanDisk Corporation of Sunnyvale, California). Figure 3 shows the card in
11 perspective, and Figure 4 is a schematic block diagram illustrating functional blocks of the card.
12 As shown, exemplary device 22 includes an external housing 102, internal flash memory or other
13 such storage segment 104, and a 9-pin serial interface 106 or other interface on or otherwise
14 extending from the housing. Housing 102 is preferably about 31 millimeters long, 24
15 millimeters wide and 2.1 millimeters thick, but may be any other desired dimensions as well.
16 Exemplary flash memory 104 may be large enough to hold 64 megabytes of data, by way of
17 example, and is shown to include a set of data 108, such as geographic data and authorization
18 parameters. Serial interface 106 comprises a set of pins or other connectors that can preferably
19 be coupled with a corresponding entity to facilitate reading from, writing to and otherwise
20 controlling the flash memory.

21 As another example, the portable data storage device 22 could reside in (or could be) a
22 personal data assistant ("PDA"), portable telephone or other such device. Many PDAs exist
23 today and provide either substantial data storage capacity and/or the capability to add expansion

1 data storage. Many PDAs include infrared communication ports or other wireless
2 communication interfaces. In this regard, for instance, the Bluetooth™ specification for short
3 range wireless communications could be employed to enable another entity, such as navigation
4 system 16 for instance, to read from, write to, or otherwise communicate with the PDA.

5 Portable data storage device 22 preferably has a unique identification (ID) code such as a
6 serial number for instance. This storage device ID is preferably stored permanently in the
7 storage device. For example, the storage device ID could be burned into ROM (read-only-
8 memory) or other permanent storage portion of the device.

9 As indicated above, each intermediate data terminal 20 may be arranged to receive some
10 or all of data 108 from authorization server 12 and to write data 108 onto the portable data
11 storage device 22. Figure 5 is a schematic block diagram showing an exemplary data terminal
12 20 in greater detail.

13 Data terminal 20 can be a general purpose computer programmed with a set of machine
14 language instructions to carry out various functions. By way of example, data terminal 20 can be
15 a personal computer in a home or business and may be accessible by a limited set of users.
16 Alternatively, for example, data terminal 20 can be situated in, or can define, a kiosk or other
17 public display and may be accessible in general by any users.

18 As illustrated in Figure 5, data terminal 20 may include a processor 42, a data store 44, a
19 memory 46, a data interface unit 48, a storage device interface 50, and a display 52. These
20 components can be coupled together by a system bus (not shown). Further, each of these
21 components may take various forms. By way of example, processor 42 may be an Intel Pentium
22 III processor, data store 44 may be a flash memory, ROM and/or magnetic or optical hard disk
23 drive, memory 46 may be RAM, data interface unit 48 may comprise a modem, transceiver,

1 antenna and/or other entity suitable for communicating over link 18 (as shown in Figure 1),
2 interface 50 may be arranged as necessary to read and write data on portable data storage device
3 22, and display 52 may be a VGA monitor. Other examples are possible as well.

4 Similar to data interface unit 32 of the authorization server, the arrangement and
5 operation of interface 50 may depend on the arrangement and operation of portable data storage
6 device 22. For example, if device 22 is a flash memory card as illustrated in Figure 3, then
7 interface 50 might comprise a flash card socket and controller as described above. As another
8 example, if device 22 is a PDA with an infrared port, then interface 50 might comprise a
9 corresponding infrared port and controller arranged to communicate data via infrared signals. As
10 still another example, if device 22 includes an RF wireless transceiver, such as a transceiver
11 conforming to the Bluetooth™ specification, then interface 50 could similarly include a wireless
12 transceiver arranged to communicate data via RF signals. Interface 50 could take still other
13 forms as well.

14 Data store 44 may hold two data components: (i) geographic data 54 and (ii) program
15 logic 56. Geographic data 54 can take various forms. For example, geographic data 54 can
16 comprise one or more databases of geographical data each corresponding, respectively, to one or
17 more geographical areas or types of information. However, in an exemplary embodiment,
18 geographic data 54 preferably contains only a portion of each database of geographic data that is,
19 by itself, not usefully accessible by a navigation system.

20 In this regard, a database or other such data product can include a set of critical
21 information (critical data) that permits the entire data product to be used. The critical
22 information could take various forms. For instance, the critical information could include a
23 number of indexes, pointers or global parameters that enable a machine (such as a computer

processor) to access the data product. As an example, for instance, a database may define a number of records or other parcels of information, and the critical information in the database may define pointers to where in the database the records or other parcels begin. As another example, the useful data in a database may be compressed or encrypted using various algorithms and parameters, and the critical information may serve as a key to the data by specifying the parameters or algorithms that a machine should use in order to decompress or decrypt the data. As yet another example, a number of records in a database may include a code representative of a useful data value, and the critical information in the database may define (or point to) the corresponding data value. Without access to the critical information, a machine may therefore be unable to access the useful data in the database.

The critical information in a database may be stored in one block in the database or may, alternatively, be distributed throughout the database. As an example, the information may be stored in a header or other block at the beginning of the database. As another example, the information may comprise a number of indexes and other general parameters disposed at the beginning of each of a number of parcels throughout the database. Typically, the critical information will comprise a relatively small portion of the database.

To illustrate, Figure 6 depicts a database 58 that has a critical portion 60 and a data portion 62. Although Figure 6 shows these portions as discrete blocks, the two may be interspersed with each other or arranged differently in the actual database. In general, the critical portion 60 contains some or all of the critical information that serves as a key to facilitate access to data in the data portion 62.

In an exemplary embodiment, the geographic data 54 contained in the data store 44 of the terminal 20 excludes some or all of the critical portion 60 of each database product. In one

embodiment, the geographic data 54 contained in the terminal 20 excludes an arbitrary-sized portion of each database product. The excluded arbitrary-sized portion corresponds to some or all the critical portion of each database product. In one embodiment, the arbitrary-sized portion corresponds to the first two kilobytes of the database product. Alternatively, the first two kilobytes might not correspond exactly to the critical information portion of a geographic database product. For example, the first two kilobytes may not include all the critical information of the database product or may include all the critical information as well as some of the data portion of the database product. However, by excluding the first two kilobytes of each database, enough of the critical portion is excluded so as to render the remainder unusable. In alternative embodiments, the arbitrary-sized portion may correspond to sizes other than two kilobytes or parts of the database product of than the first part.

The geographic data 54 stored at the terminal 20 may include just the remaining portions of each database product with the arbitrary-sized portions excluded. Alternatively, the geographic data 54 stored at the terminal 20 may include entire database products with the portions corresponding to the arbitrary-sized excluded portions replaced with random or otherwise useless data.

In turn, the geographic data 36 in the data store 28 of the authorization server 12 preferably includes at least the arbitrary-sized portions of each database that are not stored at the terminals 22. In this regard, the geographic data 36 maintained by the authorization server may comprise the entire databases of geographic information, and the authorization server may be programmed to parse the arbitrary-sized portions from a given database for transmission to a terminal 20 upon authorization. Alternatively, in an exemplary embodiment, the authorization

1 server may regularly maintain the critical portion of each database as a discrete data block ready
2 to send to a terminal upon authorization.

3 Advantageously, with this arrangement, a person or other entity with access to data stored
4 in terminal 20 can be prevented from using the databases without proper authorization, and
5 namely without access to the actual critical portions of the databases. At the same time,
6 however, terminal 20 can readily obtain the necessary critical information from authorization
7 server 12 when appropriate and can record both the critical portion 60 and the data portion 62 on
8 storage device 22 for use by navigation system 16.

9 Authorization server 12 may provide geographic data 54 via link 18 to each data terminal
10 20 periodically, upon request, or in response to other designated stimuli. Authorization server 12
11 may, for example, send geographic data 54 to data terminal 20 via link 18 in off-hours, such as
12 overnight for instance. This way, if link 18 has limited bandwidth (e.g., if link 18 is the public
13 switched telephone network, and authorization server 12 and terminal 20 communicate with each
14 other over link 18 via a 56 kbps modem connection, or if link 18 comprises a network such as the
15 Internet that tends to be congested during normal daytime hours, for instance), geographic data
16 54 can be conveyed with little if any concern.

17 Alternatively, geographic data 54 could be provided to data terminal 20 in some other
18 manner. For example, geographic data 54 could be loaded onto a CD ROM, which can be
19 physically sent to data terminal 20. A technician can then insert the CD ROM into a suitable CD
20 ROM drive in the data terminal or an arrangement could be in place to read the data from the CD
21 ROM into data store 44.

22 Program logic 56 may comprise a number of machine language instructions that define
23 routines executable by processor 42. In operation, these instructions can be loaded from data

1 store 44 into memory 46 and then executed by processor 42 to carry out various functions such
2 as interfacing with a user via display 52 and sending data to interface 50, to be written to
3 portable data storage device 22. Program logic 56 also includes an operating system (not
4 shown), such as Unix, Linux[®] or Microsoft Windows[®], for instance.

5 Data terminal 20 preferably has a unique terminal ID. This ID could be a network
6 address of the terminal or could be a more permanent terminal identifier. In the exemplary
7 embodiment, the terminal ID could be stored permanently in ROM or in another suitable manner.

8 Referring now to Figure 7, an exemplary navigation system 16 is illustrated in greater
9 detail. Exemplary navigation system 16 could be an in-vehicle navigation system or could reside
10 in a handheld (i.e., portable) device or other entity, such as a cellular telephone, PDA, pager,
11 computer or dedicated mapping or positioning device, for instance. Other examples are possible
12 as well.

13 In an exemplary embodiment, navigation system 16 includes a processor 64, a data store
14 66, a memory 68, a data interface unit 70, a positioning system 72, a display 74, and a user input
15 mechanism 76. These components may be coupled together by a bus or other communications
16 path. And the components can take various forms. By way of example, processor 64 may be an
17 Intel Pentium III microprocessor, data store 66 may be a flash memory, ROM and/or magnetic or
18 optical hard disk drive, memory 68 may be volatile RAM, data interface unit 70 may be any
19 interface suitable for facilitating communications with distribution medium 22, display 74 may
20 be an LCD display and/or other means (audible or visual) for presentation, and user input
21 mechanism 76 may be a keyboard, control knob or microphone, for instance.

22 In the exemplary embodiment, positioning system 72 outputs information about the
23 position of the navigation system (e.g., the position of a vehicle in which the system is located,

1 or the position of a person carrying the system, for instance). This information may be in terms
2 of latitude and longitude, distance and heading, or other suitable parameters. Positioning system
3 72 may comprise a GPS receiver, the arrangement and operation of which are well known to
4 those skilled in the art. Alternatively, positioning system 72 can take other forms. Positioning
5 system 72 also preferably includes an antenna 78 or other such device for receiving GPS
6 positioning signals from satellites or for receiving position information from other types of
7 entities.

8 Data store 66 may hold navigation program logic 80, which may comprise a number of
9 machine language instructions that can be loaded into memory 68 and executed by processor 64
10 to perform various functions, such as decrypting and validating data, and providing navigation
11 services, for instance. Data store 66 also holds an operating system (not shown), such as Unix,
12 Linux[®] or Microsoft Windows CE[®], for instance, which can also be loaded into memory 68 and
13 executed by processor 64. Program logic also includes a data access library used to access data
14 libraries such as SDAL, as described for instance in U.S. Patent No. 6,047,280 (the '280 patent),
15 the entirety of which is hereby incorporated by reference.

16 Although not shown in Figure 7, data store 66 can also hold other information, such as
17 geographic data for instance. In that event, navigation system 16 could obtain geographic data
18 via data interface unit 70 and store the geographic data in data store 66 or memory 68. This
19 geographic data may, for instance, be the data portion 62 of one or more geographic databases,
20 as shown in Figure 6 and described above. With this arrangement, the navigation system would
21 not be able to usefully access the geographic data of a given database until the navigation system
22 obtains the critical portion 60 of the database as well. In the exemplary embodiment, however,

1 geographic data is primarily maintained on portable data storage device 22 and is read by
2 processor 64 into memory 68 from device 22.

3 In the exemplary embodiment, as noted above, data interface unit 70 serves to facilitate
4 communication with portable data storage device 22. Therefore, data interface unit 70 preferably
5 includes a port for communicating with storage device 22. Similar to the interface 32 of the
6 authorization server and interface 50 of terminal 20, the arrangement and operation of data
7 interface unit 70 may depend on the arrangement and operation of portable data storage device
8 22. Thus, data interface unit 70 might comprise a flash card socket, an infrared port, and/or an
9 RF transceiver, for example.

10 Some or all of the components of navigation system 16 are preferably located in positions
11 where they are readily accessible to a user for whom navigation services are to be provided. For
12 example, if navigation system 16 is an in-vehicle navigation system, display 74 and user input
13 mechanism 76 may be integrated in the vehicle dashboard for easy access by a driver, and the
14 other components of the system can be hidden behind the dashboard or in another suitable
15 location.

16 Data interface unit 70 may also be provided in the vehicle dashboard or could be hidden
17 from view, depending on how the data interface unit 70 is arranged to communicate data. For
18 example, if data interface unit 70 is arranged to communicate with portable data storage device
19 22 via an electrical connection, then data interface unit 70, or at least an electrical connection to
20 the unit, will preferably be exposed to facilitate user access. For instance, data interface unit 70
21 could be arranged as a socket or slot within the vehicle dashboard, into which a flash card could
22 be inserted, similar to the socket described above. On the other hand, if data interface unit 70 is

1 arranged to communicate with portable data storage device 22 via a wireless link, for instance,
2 then unit 70 could be hidden from the user.

3 Similarly, if navigation system 16 is provided in a handheld device, such as a PDA, a
4 cellular telephone or a dedicated positioning device, for instance, some of the components can be
5 provided on the exterior surface of the device so as to facilitate user interaction, and other
6 components can be hidden within the device. For example, on a PDA, a touch-sensitive display
7 could serve as both display 74 and user input mechanism 76, and an expansion port or other link
8 (e.g., an infrared port or antenna) could serve as the data interface unit 70. Other components of
9 the navigation system can then be incorporated internally with the normal components of the
10 PDA.

11 In an exemplary embodiment, navigation system program logic 80 uses the output of
12 positioning system 72, in combination with geographic data 108 stored on the portable storage
13 device 22, to provide navigation services, features and information to a user of the navigation
14 system. Using output from the positioning system 72 and geographic data 108, program logic 80
15 preferably provides a map 82, a direction indicator (e.g., a turn arrow) and/or other information
16 on display 74. A map 82, for instance, may illustrate the location of the navigation system in a
17 given geographical area. Program logic 80 may provide information about what points of
18 interest are available, distances to various points of interest, directions (visual and/or audible) to
19 a desired destination, such as a street address or point of interest, and so forth. User input
20 mechanism 76, which may comprise a control knob, keyboard, or microphone, for instance,
21 allows a user to specify a desired destination, in response to which program logic may generate
22 and display directions to the destination.

1 Navigation system 16 will likely have a specific make (vendor) and model number.
2 Additionally, navigation system 16 preferably has a unique navigation system ID, such as a serial
3 number or other code. In addition to uniquely identifying the navigation system, the navigation
4 system ID may also be indicative of the navigation system make and model. In an exemplary
5 embodiment, the navigation system ID is stored permanently in the navigation system, such as in
6 ROM for instance.

7 Navigation systems as described above can be manufactured and assembled and then
8 sold, rented or otherwise distributed to consumers through any suitable distribution channels.
9 For example, in-vehicle navigation systems can be sold or rented by car dealerships as optional
10 or standard equipment in vehicles. As another example, retail stores may sell dedicated GPS-
11 based navigation devices to users. As still another example, vendors may sell or otherwise
12 provide software navigation systems that use geographic data to generate maps and directions,
13 even without including or using positioning systems. Such navigation applications can be
14 executed by a computer that has functional elements similar to those of navigation system 16, for
15 instance.

16 When a user obtains navigation system 16, the user may also obtain a navigation system
17 ID card, which identifies the navigation system by its model number and navigation system ID.
18 The information on the card may be machine readable, such as via a magnetic strip or RF tag for
19 instance. The user may also obtain a user ID card or other indication of a user ID, which
20 uniquely identifies the user. The user ID card may similarly indicate the user ID in machine
21 readable form.

B. Exemplary Provisioning of Geographic Data

In order for navigation system 16 to provide navigation services, it should have access to a database or other set of geographic data. With the exemplary embodiment as described above, a database of geographic data can be provided to navigation system 16 on portable data storage device 22. Therefore, according to the exemplary embodiment, when a user first obtains navigation system 16, the user preferably also obtains a portable storage device 22, suitable for containing geographic data. The user may obtain the data storage device 22 from the same entity that provided the user with the navigation system 16.

For instance, when a user obtains a car that has a navigation system installed as standard equipment, the car may come with a portable data storage device 22 as well. As another example, when a user buys a navigation system at a retail outlet, the system may also include a portable data storage device 22. Alternatively, the user may purchase the portable data storage device separately or obtain the device at some other time or in some other way.

When the user first obtains the portable data storage device 22, the storage device might come pre-loaded with geographic data for a specific geographical area (such as a city, state or other region, for instance). In that event, however, the user may at some point wish to update the set of geographic data on device 22 so as to have the data reflect more current road conditions and points-of-interest. Alternatively, the user may at some point wish to replace the geographic data on the storage device with geographic data for a different geographical area. Still alternatively, storage device 22 may not contain any geographic data to start. In that event, the user may wish to load a set of geographic data onto the storage device to facilitate operation of the user's navigation system in a given geographic area.

1 Various processes may be employed in order to load a geographic database onto portable
2 storage device 22. As indicated above, for example, authorization server 12 can send some or all
3 of the database to intermediate terminal 20, and terminal 20 can then record the database onto
4 storage device 22. Figure 8 is a flow chart depicting an exemplary process that may be
5 performed in order to provide a database of geographic data to portable data storage device 22 in
6 this way, and in turn to provide the data for use by a navigation system 16.

7 As shown in Figure 8, at block 150, a user first couples storage device 22 with the
8 interface 50 of terminal 20. For example, if storage device 22 is a flash card, the user may insert
9 the card into a corresponding flash card socket at terminal 20. At block 152, terminal 20 detects
10 the presence of storage device 22 and reads the storage device ID from the permanent storage
11 portion of storage device 22. In this example, terminal 20 may also attempt to read geographic
12 data from the storage device and determine that the storage device does not yet contain
13 geographic data.

14 At block 154, terminal 20 then preferably prompts the user to input the user's ID (and
15 perhaps a personal identification number (PIN)) and the navigation system ID in connection with
16 which the user will want to use the geographic data. At block 156, the user supplies this
17 information. As indicated above, the navigation system ID and user ID can be encoded in
18 machine readable form on one or more ID cards. Terminal 20 may include means for reading
19 those cards and obtaining the user and system IDs. Alternatively, for instance, the user could
20 type or otherwise enter the user ID and navigation system ID into the data terminal.

21 At block 158, terminal 20 may then prompt the user to select from a menu of
22 geographical regions for which geographic data can be loaded onto device 22. The menu may,
23 for instance, list all of the regions for which data store 44 of terminal 20 currently contains

1 geographic data. (As noted above, in an exemplary embodiment, data store 44 may contain
2 geographic data in the form of only the data portions 62 of various geographic databases. Each
3 data portion maintained by terminal 20 could be labeled or otherwise cross-referenced to
4 correspond with a particular geographical region.)

5 At block 160, the user may then select a desired region (or multiple regions). At block
6 162, terminal 20 may then responsively prompt the user to indicate whether the user wishes to (i)
7 purchase the data or (ii) rent the data for a certain period of time or for a certain number of uses.
8 At block 164, the user may respond by selecting either "purchase" or "rent" with specified time
9 or uses for instance.

10 At block 166, terminal 20 may also prompt the user to select from a number of special
11 geographic data options. These options may take various forms. For instance, an option might
12 be for the user to be able to access Fodor's® Restaurant Guide and/or special geographic areas on
13 navigation system 16. Each option might have a corresponding option number. And terminal 20
14 may also prompt the user to select a desired period of use or number of uses for a given option.
15 At block 168, the user may respond to the terminal by selecting one or more options and criteria
16 for use.

17 At block 170, terminal 20 may then prompt the user to supply payment information, such
18 as a credit or debit card number for instance. And at block 172, the user may provide the
19 requested payment information. In an exemplary embodiment, the dealer that sold the user the
20 navigation system 16 and/or the storage device 22 may have provided the user with a pre-
21 payment code, which the user may supply to terminal 20 to satisfy payment. The dealer could
22 then be ultimately accountable for the payment.

1 At block 174, terminal 20 then sends via link 18 to authorization server 12 a set of
2 information preferably including (i) the user ID, (ii) the storage device ID, (iii) the navigation
3 system ID, (iv) the selected geographic region (which might be the database name, for instance),
4 (v) rental time period or times of use, if applicable, (vi) options and periods or numbers of use of
5 options, (vii) the terminal ID, and (viii) the payment information. Authorization server 12, in
6 turn, receives this set of information.

7 At block 176, authorization server 12 queries its authorization database 40 to determine
8 whether the user is already authorized to receive the requested geographic data to be stored on
9 the specified storage device and accessed by the specified navigation system. This query may be
10 keyed to the user ID provided from terminal 20 for instance. This example will assume that a
11 user record does not yet exist in authorization database 40.

12 In addition, if the user has provided a PIN in connection with the user ID, the
13 authorization server may verify that the PIN is correct, by reference to a PIN table in the
14 authorization database 40. In the event the PIN is not correct, the authorization server may
15 return a signal to the data terminal, indicating that the session cannot continue absent a correct
16 PIN.

17 At block 178, finding no corresponding user record, authorization server 12 establishes a
18 user record indicating that, for the user having the user ID, the storage device having the storage
19 device ID is authorized to hold a particular database of geographic data, and the navigation
20 system having the navigation system ID is authorized to access the particular database of
21 geographic data. Further, to the extent the user elected to rent the data for only a specific time
22 period or for a number of uses, authorization server 12 may record in the user record an

1 expiration date or a count of number of allowed uses. At block 180, authorization server 12 may
2 then prepare and send data to terminal 20, to be written to storage device 22.

3 Authorization server 12 can send to terminal 20 the entire database of geographic data
4 corresponding to the region selected by the user. (This database may be referred to as the
5 "selected database.") However, in the exemplary embodiment, terminal 20 is assumed to already
6 have the data portion 62 of the database stored in its data store 44. Therefore, conveniently,
7 authorization server 12 will preferably send only the critical portion 60 of the database to
8 terminal 20. Advantageously, this will take far less time than it would take for the authorization
9 server to send the entire database to terminal 20.

10 When the critical portion 60 is combined with the data portion 62 of the database that is
11 stored in data store 44 of terminal 20 and the combination is provided to a system such as
12 navigation system 16, the system should be able to use the critical portion as a key to access the
13 data in the database. However, as noted above, the exemplary embodiment seeks to avoid some
14 of the risks associated with releasing valuable information such as geographic data. Therefore,
15 rather than simply sending the critical portion (or the entire database, if desired) to terminal 20,
16 authorization server 12 preferably first encrypts and/or otherwise secures the critical portion (or
17 entire database), producing a set of secure data, so as to avoid unauthorized use of the database.
18 Details of how this process may work in practice will be provided below.

19 At block 182, terminal 20 receives the secure data sent from authorization server 12. At
20 block 184, terminal 20 then writes to portable data storage device 22 (i) the data portion of the
21 database, which terminal 20 maintained in its data store 44, and (ii) the secure data that terminal
22 20 received from authorization server 12. As a result, at this point, data storage device 20
23 contains a secure copy of the selected database.

1 At block 186, terminal 20 then informs the user that storage device 22 is ready for use.
2 Therefore, at block 188, the user removes the storage device from communication with terminal
3 20 and, at block 190, the user communicatively couples the storage device with navigation
4 system 16. For example, if storage device 22 is a flash card, the user may insert the device into a
5 corresponding flash card socket of navigation system 16. As another example, if storage device
6 22 has a Bluetooth™ RF interface, the user may bring device 22 within an appropriate range of
7 navigation system 16 so as to couple device 22 with a corresponding data interface unit 70 of the
8 navigation system.

9 At block 192, navigation system 16 is then powered up or receives a request to provide
10 navigation services. For example, the user may engage user interface mechanism 76 in order to
11 instruct the navigation system that the user wants to travel to a specified destination address or
12 point of interest. In response, the navigation system would ordinarily retrieve geographic data
13 from data storage device 22 and use that data in combination with positioning information
14 provided by positioning system 72 to generate map 82 showing the user how to get to the
15 specified destination.

16 In the exemplary embodiment, at block 194, navigation system 16 may detect the
17 presence of device 22. In turn, at block 196, navigation system 16 may responsively seek to
18 access the database on the storage device. To do so, navigation system 16 preferably performs a
19 process to validate and/or facilitate access to the database. This process will depend on the
20 process used to secure the database. The process may be predetermined and/or may be identified
21 by a message stored on storage device 22 together with the set of secure data. Details of how
22 this process may work in practice will be provided below as well.

1 At block 198, assuming that the navigation system is precluded from accessing the
2 geographic data stored on device 22, the navigation system may audibly and/or visually alert the
3 user that navigation services are unavailable. In doing so, the navigation system may present on
4 display 74 the reasons for refusal of service. Further, in an exemplary embodiment, possibly
5 depending on the reasons for denial of service, the navigation system may send a message to a
6 central office to report the failed attempt. The navigation system may, for instance, send the
7 message over a wireless telecommunications network as an industry standard short message
8 service (SMS) message or in another manner.

9 Alternatively, at block 200, assuming that the navigation system can properly and
10 successfully access the geographic data stored on device 22, the navigation system will do so.
11 The system may then use the geographic data to provide the navigation services requested by the
12 user.

13 **C. Exemplary Securing of Data and Secure Communication of Data**

14 As noted above, the process of securing the data, and securely communicating the data,
15 can take various forms. Generally speaking, by way of example, the process may involve (i)
16 encrypting the critical portion 60 so as to establish an encrypted critical portion that can be
17 decrypted using a decryption key, (ii) establishing a set of authorization parameters useful for
18 validating and/or facilitating access to the database, and (iii) tying the authorization parameters
19 to the encrypted critical portion. At the receiving end, such as a navigation system 16, the
20 process may then involve (iv) using the authorization parameters to validate and/or facilitate
21 access to the database, (v) using the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted critical portion, and
22 then (vi) using the critical portion to facilitate access to the data portion of the database. This
23 process may facilitate securing the data, while allowing the data to be used in connection with

1 one or more authorized entities (such being stored on a given data storage medium, or being used
2 by a given navigation system, for instance). Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 are flow charts showing
3 specific examples of how this process may work in practice.

4 Figure 9 illustrates a set of functional blocks that may be involved in securing and
5 providing data to a navigation system in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the
6 invention. As shown in Figure 9, at block 250, the authorization server generates a random key
7 (e.g., bit string) to be associated with the selected database. (As understood in the art, it may be
8 impossible to generate a truly "random" key. However, techniques are well known for
9 generating substantially random data, and those techniques may be employed here. In this
10 regard, the term "random" may be equated with the term "substantially random.") At block 252,
11 the authorization server then uses the random key to symmetrically encrypt the critical portion 60
12 of the database, so as to produce an encrypted critical portion that can be decrypted using the
13 random key.

14 Methods of symmetric encryption are very well known in the art and others may be
15 developed in the future as well. Examples of suitable symmetric encryption methods include the
16 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and "Two Fish" by Bruce Schneier. Similarly, other
17 suitable methods of encryption, such as public key / private key encryption are also well known
18 in the art. Examples of such methods include elliptical curve cryptography, pretty-good-privacy
19 (PGP) and RSA. These and other encryption methods are well known to those skilled in the art
20 and are described, for instance, in Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography -- Protocols, Algorithms,
21 and Source Code in C," Chapters 11-14, 18-19 and 24 (2d ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996),
22 and Schneier, B. et al., "Twofish: A 128-Bit Block Cipher," [http://www.counterpane.com/](http://www.counterpane.com/twofish.html)
23 [twofish.html](http://www.counterpane.com/twofish.html) (June 15, 1998), both of which are hereby incorporated by reference.

1 At block 254, the authorization server next assembles a set of authorization parameters
2 and combines the parameters to establish an authorization key that includes verification
3 information useful for validating use of the database. In the exemplary embodiment, these
4 parameters may comprise the following, for instance:

- 5 1. SYSTEM INFORMATION. These parameters may include information
6 indicating entities of the system that are authorized to possess and/or access the
7 selected database. These parameters preferably include (i) the navigation system
8 ID and (ii) the data storage ID.
 - 9 2. DATABASE INFORMATION. These parameters may define information about
10 the specific database that is being provided. For instance, this information may
11 include (i) the database name, which may be indicated by a field in the database,
12 (ii) a unique serial number, which the authorization server has inserted into the
13 critical portion to identify the copy of the database, (iii) the database version (e.g.,
14 revision number) (iv) a randomly generated index into the critical portion, and the
15 32-bit value stored at that index, and (v) optional database information selected by
16 the user, such as Fodor's® Restaurant Guide, for instance.
 - 17 3. DATABASE DECRYPTION KEY. This parameter is the decryption key that can
18 be used to decrypt the encrypted critical portion. Given that the authorization
19 server symmetrically encrypted the critical portion with the randomly generated
20 key, this decryption key is the randomly generated key. However, this parameter
21 may vary depending on the type of encryption performed and consequently on the
22 type of decryption required.
- 23

- 1
- 2 4. ACCESS LIMITATIONS. These parameters may include (i) a data range during
- 3 which the database and/or a specific option is authorized to be used and (ii) a
- 4 count of the number of times the database and/or option is authorized to be
- 5 accessed.
- 6 5. TRACING INFORMATION. These parameters may define information that can
- 7 be used by a geographic data provider to trace the source of fraudulent copies of
- 8 geographic data. These parameters may include, for instance, (i) the user ID, (ii)
- 9 the navigation system ID, make and model, (iii) the time and date that the
- 10 authorization key is being generated, and (iv) the data terminal ID.

11 Alternatively, the parameters may take other forms as well. Authorization server 12 may

12 combine these parameters together in any desired manner to establish the authorization key. For

13 instance, assuming that each parameter can be represented as a character string or bit string,

14 authorization server 12 can concatenate or interleave the character strings or bit strings. At block

15 256, the authorization server preferably also computes a CRC or checksum of the authorization

16 key and appends or otherwise adds that CRC or checksum to the authorization key. (As used

17 herein, the terms "CRC" and "checksum" can be considered to be equivalent. Further, other

18 types of hash functions could also be considered to be equivalent as well.)

19 At block 258, the authorization server then encrypts the authorization key so as to

20 produce an encrypted authorization key that can be decrypted with a particular decryption key.

21 As noted above, each model of a navigation system preferably has its own private/public key

22 pair, and the encryption key to be used for the given model is preferably stored in the

23 authorization server authorization database 40. (As further noted above, the authorization server

1 may encrypt using the private key, allowing the navigation system to decrypt using the public
2 key. Alternatively, the authorization server may encrypt using the public key, allowing the
3 navigation system to decrypt using the private key.) Thus, given the navigation system ID
4 (which may define or cross-reference to a navigation system model number, for instance), the
5 authorization server may retrieve the applicable encryption key from authorization database 40
6 and may use that encryption key to encrypt the authorization key.

7 At block 260, the authorization server then preferably sends to terminal 20 via link 18 (i)
8 the encrypted critical portion of the database and (ii) the encrypted authorization key. At block
9 262, as described above, terminal 20 may then record the encrypted critical portion, the
10 encrypted authorization key, and the data portion 62 onto data storage device 22. And, at block
11 264, a user may couple device 22 with navigation system 16.

12 Figure 10 next illustrates a set of functional blocks that may be involved in retrieval,
13 decryption and validation of the data at the navigation system. The functions performed in these
14 blocks may be performed in the interface layer software described in the '280 patent, for
15 instance, and, more particularly, in the media device isolation layer described therein. Referring
16 to Figure 10, at block 266, navigation system 16 may first read the encrypted authorization key
17 from device 22. At block 268, the navigation system will then apply its designated decryption
18 key to decrypt the encrypted authorization key so as to produce a plaintext authorization key. In
19 the exemplary embodiment, if the user tries to use the database in connection with a navigation
20 system that is not the model corresponding to the navigation system ID that the user provided,
21 the navigation system will not have the correct decryption key and therefore will not be able to
22 access the data.

1 At block 270, assuming successful decryption of the encrypted authorization key, the
2 navigation system may then use some or all of the authorization parameters to validate (i.e.,
3 establish authority to use) the database. By way of example, the navigation system may read the
4 storage device ID from the permanent memory of storage device 22 and may determine whether
5 that storage device ID matches the storage device ID provided in the authorization key. If the
6 storage device ID does not match, the navigation system may conclude that the storage device
7 contains an unauthorized copy of the database, and the navigation system may therefore refuse to
8 access the database.

9 As another example, the navigation system may determine whether its own navigation
10 system ID matches the navigation system ID provided in the authorization key. If the navigation
11 system ID does not match, the navigation system may conclude that it is not authorized to access
12 the database, and the navigation system may therefore refuse to access the database.

13 As still another example, the navigation system may use the access limitations, such as a
14 rental period or use restriction, to determine whether access is currently authorized. Specifically,
15 for example, the navigation system may determine whether the current date (as provided by the
16 GPS positioning system, for instance) falls within the date range specified in the authorization
17 key and, if the date falls outside the range, may refuse to access the database.

18 At block 272, with successful validation, the navigation system may then decrypt the
19 encrypted critical portion. In particular, the navigation system may (i) read into memory 68 from
20 the storage device 22 the encrypted critical portion, (ii) retrieve from the authorization key the
21 decryption key required for decryption of the encrypted critical portion, and (ii) use the
22 decryption key to decrypt the encrypted critical portion.

1 At block 274, the navigation system may then use the information within the critical
2 portion 60 (e.g., decompression information, indexes and pointers) as keys to access the
3 geographic data in the data portion 62. In the exemplary embodiment, the data portion remains
4 stored on data storage device 22, while the decrypted critical portion is stored in the volatile
5 memory 68 of the navigation system 16. As long as storage device 22 remains coupled with
6 navigation system 16, the navigation system may thereby continue to access the database of
7 geographical data so as to provide navigation services. When storage device 22 is removed from
8 communication with navigation system 16 or at another suitable time, the decrypted critical
9 portion is preferably cleared from memory 68, thereby preserving the security of the data
10 portion.

11 While the foregoing provides a robust method of securing geographic data, an alternative
12 process can be employed so as to provide enhanced security. In the alternative process,
13 authorization server 12 can instead symmetrically encrypt the authorization parameters and use
14 public/private key encryption to encrypt only the symmetric key, preferably together with a value
15 representative of the authorization key, rather than to encrypt the entire authorization key.
16 Figure 11 is a flow chart illustrating a set of functional blocks that may be involved in this
17 alternative process.

18 As shown in Figure 11, at block 350, the authorization server generates a random key to
19 be associated with the selected database. At block 352, the authorization server then uses the
20 random key to symmetrically encrypt the critical portion of the database, so as to produce an
21 encrypted critical portion that can be decrypted using the random key.

22 At block 354, the authorization server then assembles a set of authorization parameters
23 and combines the parameters to establish an authorization key. These parameters may be those

1 described above, for instance, including the random key necessary for decryption of the
2 encrypted critical portion.

3 At block 356, the authorization server computes a checksum or CRC, C, of the
4 authorization key. At block 358, the authorization server then generates a random value, R, and
5 uses R to symmetrically encrypt the authorization key, rather than public key encrypting the
6 authorization key.

7 At block 360, the authorization server combines together the values C and R, such as by
8 concatenating or interleaving the values for instance, to produce a value V. At block 362, the
9 authorization server uses the private key (associated with the navigation system model) to
10 encrypt the value V. Finally, at block 364, the authorization server sends to terminal 20 (i) the
11 encrypted value V, (ii) the encrypted authorization key, and (ii) the encrypted critical portion.

12 Upon receipt of this information, at block 366, terminal 20 then preferably records onto
13 data storage device, (i) the encrypted value V, (ii) the encrypted authorization key, (iii) the
14 encrypted critical portion, and (iv) the unintelligible data portion of the database.

15 When the navigation system receives data storage device 22 and seeks to access the
16 database, at block 368, the navigation system uses its public key to decrypt the encrypted value
17 V. The navigation system may therefore retrieve values R and C from value V. At block 370,
18 the navigation system then uses value R to symmetrically decrypt the encrypted authorization
19 key. At block 372, the navigation system then computes the checksum or CRC of the
20 authorization key and compares the resulting value with value C. If value C matches, then, at
21 block 374, the navigation system proceeds to use the authorization parameters to validate use of
22 the database as described above. Alternatively, if value C does not match, then, at block 376, the
23 navigation system may refuse to access the geographic database.

1 In yet another exemplary embodiment, the process of securing geographic data can be
2 still further enhanced. In this further embodiment, the authorization key can be encrypted in
3 such as way that the decryption key required to access the authorization key is itself tied to
4 environmental parameters, such as the authorization parameters and/or contents of the database.
5 Figure 12 is a flow chart depicting an example of this further enhanced security process.

6 As shown in Figure 12, at block 450, the authorization server generates a random value,
7 K, and uses the value K as a key to symmetrically encrypt the critical portion of the database, so
8 as to produce an encrypted critical portion that can be decrypted using the value K.

9 At block 452, the authorization server then assembles a set of authorization parameters
10 and combines the parameters to establish an authorization key. These parameters may be the
11 same as those described above, except that the parameters preferably exclude the navigation
12 system ID and the storage device ID. The navigation system ID and storage device ID will
13 instead be used in the process of producing a symmetric key for encrypting the authorization key.
14 Further, the parameters preferably do not yet include the value K required for decryption of the
15 encrypted critical portion of the database. Still further, the parameters may exclude the database
16 version information and other such information (since, as will be noted below, other intrinsic
17 information about the database (e.g., bytes of the database) may be incorporated in the securing
18 process instead).

19 At block 454, the authorization server calculates a checksum or CRC, C, of the
20 authorization key. At block 456, the authorization server may then generate an ID value, N,
21 which the authorization server may record in its data store 28 as a key to a database record
22 indicative of environmental parameters such as the user, the navigation system and the storage
23 device for instance.

1 Next, at block 458, the authorization server computes a one-way hash function or other
2 function to generate an output value H. The hash function is preferably based on the
3 authorization key. In particular, for instance, the inputs to the hash function are preferably
4 values that should be accessible by both the machine generating the authorization key (i.e.,
5 authorization server 12) and the machine that will decrypt the authorization key (i.e., navigation
6 system 16). In this exemplary embodiment, the inputs to the hash function include
7 environmental parameters, such as (i) the navigation system ID, (ii) the storage device ID, (iii)
8 the ID value N, (iv) the checksum or CRC value C, and (v) a predetermined number of bytes
9 selected from a predetermined location of the encrypted critical portion of the database. Suitable
10 hash functions are well known to those skilled in the art, as described, for instance, in Schneier,
11 B., "Applied Cryptography -- Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C," Chapters 11-14,
12 18-19 and 24 (2d ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996).

13 At block 460, the authorization server may then XOR or otherwise combine the output
14 value H with the random value K that was used to symmetrically encrypt the critical portion of
15 the database, and the authorization server may thereby produce a value K'. At block 462, the
16 authorization server may then append or otherwise add the value K' to the authorization key.
17 This way, a machine seeking to access the database will be forced to first establish the value H
18 and then XOR the value H with the value K', so as to recover the value K for use in decrypting
19 the encrypted critical portion. Therefore, the machine seeking access to the data will need to
20 have access to the parameters that were used to establish the value H (such as navigation system
21 ID and storage device ID, for instance) in order for the machine to effectively have access to the
22 decryption key K, in order to facilitate decryption of the critical portion and, in turn, in order to
23 facilitate access to the database.

1 At block 464, the authorization server preferably uses the value H as a symmetric key to
2 encrypt the authorization key, so as to produce an encrypted authorization key that can be
3 decrypted using the value H. Again, because the value H stems from certain environmental
4 parameters such as the navigation system ID and storage device ID, for instance, a machine
5 seeking access to the database will need to know these parameters in order to facilitate access to
6 the database, thereby providing added security.

7 At block 466, the authorization server may next combine together the ID value N with the
8 checksum or CRC value C, such as by concatenating or interleaving the values for instance, to
9 produce a value V. At block 468, the authorization server then uses the private key (associated
10 with the navigation system model) to encrypt the value V. Finally, at block 470, the
11 authorization server sends to terminal 20 (i) the encrypted value V, (ii) the encrypted
12 authorization key, and (ii) the encrypted critical portion.

13 Upon receipt of this information, at block 472, terminal 20 then preferably records onto
14 data storage device, (i) the encrypted value V, (ii) the encrypted authorization key, (iii) the
15 encrypted critical portion, and (iv) the unintelligible data portion of the database.

16 When the navigation system receives data storage device 22 and seeks to access the
17 database, at block 474, the navigation system uses its public key to decrypt the encrypted value
18 V. The navigation system may therefore retrieve values N and C from value V.

19 At block 476, the navigation system then computes the same hash function that the
20 authorization server computed, with the same inputs used by the authorization server. In the
21 exemplary embodiment, therefore, if navigation system does not have access to the
22 environmental parameters, such as the navigation system ID and storage device ID, the
23 navigation system will not be able to successfully compute the same value H that the

1 authorization server computed, and the navigation system may be precluded from accessing the
2 database. Similarly, if the navigation system does not have the required public key and is
3 therefore unable to decrypt encrypted value V at block 474, it will not be able to uncover values
4 N and C and, consequently, it will not be able to compute the hash function. However, if the
5 navigation system has access to, and uses, the appropriate inputs, the hash function will produce
6 the value H.

7 At block 478, the navigation system then uses the computed value H as a symmetric key
8 to decrypt the encrypted authorization key. In turn, at block 480, the navigation system
9 computes the checksum or CRC of the authorization key and compares that value to the value C
10 that it retrieved from the value V. If value C does not match, then, at block 482, the navigation
11 system may refuse to access the database. Alternatively, if value C matches, then the navigation
12 system continues to block 484. At block 484, the navigation system extracts from the
13 authorization key the value K', and, at block 486, the navigation system XORs or otherwise
14 combines K' with H so as to reveal the value K.

15 At block 488, the navigation system may use other parameters of the authorization key to
16 validate use of the database. Finally, assuming successful validation, at block 490, the
17 navigation system may use the value K as a symmetric key to decrypt the encrypted critical
18 portion of the database and may proceed to access and use the data portion of the database.

19 In still a further exemplary embodiment, the process of securing geographic data can be
20 additionally enhanced, still tying the authorization key to environmental parameters. In this
21 further embodiment, the authorization server may first generate a random number K and may
22 then use that random number K as a key to symmetrically encrypt the critical portion of the
23 database. The authorization server may then compile a first portion A' of an authorization key,

1 including parameters such as a pointer to a randomly selected location of the database and a
2 value at that location, starting and ending dates for data validity, maximum use count, and
3 information about selected options. The authorization server may also include in the first portion
4 A' one or more values computed as a one-way hash function of the critical portion of the
5 database.

6 The authorization server may then apply a one-way hash function, whose inputs may be
7 the navigation system ID, the storage device ID, the first portion A' of the authorization key,
8 some number of bytes from the encrypted critical portion, and/or other parameters that may be
9 accessible by both the navigation system and the authorization server. The output of the hash
10 function may be designated H.

11 The authorization server may then XOR the output H with the random number K, so as to
12 produce a value K'. In turn, the authorization server may store the value K' in a second portion
13 A" of the authorization key. The authorization server may then calculate a CRC or hash function
14 of A' and K' (or perhaps just a CRC or hash function of just A') and store the result in the second
15 portion A" as well.

16 Next, the authorization server may append or otherwise combine together A' and A" to
17 produce an authorization key A. The authorization server may then encrypt the authorization
18 key with the navigation system's private key (or public key). Finally, the authorization server
19 may send to terminal 20 the symmetrically encrypted critical portion of the database and the
20 encrypted authorization key.

21 Upon receipt of this information, terminal 20 may record the information onto the data
22 storage device 22, together with the unintelligible portion of the database. Thereafter, when the
23 data storage device is coupled with the navigation system, the navigation system may use its

1 public key (or private key) to decrypt the encrypted authorization key, so as to recover the
2 plaintext authorization key A.

3 The navigation system may then compute the same CRC or hash function of A and K'
4 that the authorization server computed and may compare the result with the value stored in the
5 second portion A" of the authorization key. If the values do not match, then the navigation
6 system may be programmed to abort its efforts to access the data.

7 The navigation system may next check to ensure that the current date is between the
8 starting and ending dates provided in the first portion A' of the authorization key. If the current
9 date does not fall within the allowed date range, then the navigation system may also be
10 programmed to abort.

11 The navigation system may then compute the same hash function that the authorization
12 server computed, with the same inputs used by the authorization server, so as to produce the
13 output H. In turn, the navigation system may XOR the value H with the value K' that is stored in
14 the second portion A" of the authorization key, so as to recover the value K. Thereafter, the
15 navigation system may use the value K as a key to symmetrically decrypt the encrypted critical
16 portion of the database and may then proceed to access and use the data portion of the database.

17 In this exemplary embodiment, the navigation system would therefore need to have
18 access to environmental parameters such as the navigation system ID and storage device ID as
19 used in the hash function computed by the authorization server. Absent access to such
20 information, the navigation system would be prevented from computing the value H, which
21 would prevent the navigation system from uncovering the value K needed to symmetrically
22 decrypt the critical portion of the database.

1 Further, in an arrangement where the authorization server included in first portion A' one
2 or more hash values of the critical portion of the database, the navigation system may be
3 programmed to verify those hash values by computing the same hash function as applied by the
4 authorization server and comparing the resulting values.

5 **D. Exemplary Advantages**

6 The system and method described by way of example in this specification can
7 advantageously help avoid many of the security risks associated with providing valuable data,
8 such as geographic data. For instance, in various embodiments, the system and method can help
9 foil attempts at fraud in the following manners:

- 10 1. If someone tries to copy the data to another storage device, the machine seeking
11 to access the data may determine that the storage device is not authorized to hold
12 the data and may therefore refuse to access the data.
- 13 2. If someone tries to access the data using a machine other than the authorized
14 machine, the machine may determine that it is not authorized to access the data
15 and may therefore refuse to access the data.
- 16 3. If someone tries to use the authorization key to access data other than the data for
17 which the authorization key was generated, access may be precluded.
- 18 4. If someone tries to use an expired set of data (such as a database for which a
19 rental period or number of uses has expired), access may be precluded.
- 20 5. If someone tries to access the data using a machine that is not programmed to
21 perform validation, access may be precluded.

22 In addition, the exemplary embodiments provide additional security features. For
23 example, a random encryption key is used for each instance of a database, thereby helping to

1 prevent certain types of cryptanalysis. As another example, by tying authorization to database
2 access libraries (e.g., the critical portion of a database), authorization becomes required in order
3 to access the database. Therefore, navigation system vendor may have to include authorization
4 functions in their systems.

5 **E. Alternative Embodiment**

6 In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, some or all of the geographic data
7 or authorization information can be provided more directly from the authorization server to the
8 navigation system. Figure 13 is a simplified block diagram illustrating this alternative
9 embodiment by way of example.

10 In this alternative embodiment, as shown in Figure 13, a communications link 14 couples
11 the authorization server 12 to a representative navigation system 16. Link 14 may take any form
12 suitable for carrying communications between authorization server 12 and navigation system 16.
13 For instance, link 14 may include or take the form of a satellite or cellular communications
14 system or other wireless interface and/or the public switched telephone network or other landline
15 interface. As such, link 14 may include various intermediate elements as well (not shown in
16 Figure 13).

17 In this embodiment, the data interface units 32, 70 of authorization server 12 and
18 navigation system 16 then take a form suitable for communicating with link 14. Alternatively,
19 authorization server 12 and/or navigation system 16 each include an additional data interface unit
20 suitable for communicating with link 14. For instance, if link 14 is a cellular
21 telecommunications network, then navigation system 16 preferably includes the components that
22 would ordinarily be found within a cellular telephone or other mobile station (such as an

1 appropriate RF transceiver and the program logic necessary to originate and terminate calls, for
2 example).

3 In this embodiment, authorization server 12 can itself convey the entire secured
4 geographic database to navigation system 16 via link 14. In particular, authorization server 12
5 preferably prepares and provides to navigation system 16 (i) the authorization material (e.g.,
6 encrypted critical portion and authorization parameters, etc.) described above as being provided
7 by authorization server 12 to data distribution terminal 20 and (ii) the data portion 62 of a
8 geographic database to be used by the navigation system 16. The authorization server may
9 provide this material to the navigation system on request or in response to another specified
10 stimulus. Further, in the event the navigation system already has the data portion 62 of a given
11 database, the authorization server may conveniently send only the authorization material to the
12 navigation system. The navigation system 16 may then employ a process equivalent to that
13 described above, to decrypt, validate and use the database.

14 As shown in Figure 13, communications link 18, data terminal 20, and portable data
15 storage device 22 may also still be employed to carry information from authorization server 12 to
16 navigation system 16 in this alternative embodiment. In this arrangement, for instance, some
17 information may be conveyed via link 14 to the navigation system 16, and other information may
18 be conveyed via link 18 to data terminal 20 and then via portable storage device 22 to navigation
19 system 16.

20 As a particular example, a user may load the data portion 62 of a database onto storage
21 device 22 at terminal 20, for instance, and then couple the storage device with a navigation
22 system 16. In providing the user with the data portion 62, terminal 20 may communicate with
23 authorization server 12 to an extent as provided above, and authorization server 12 may establish

1 the necessary authorization material (e.g., encrypted critical portion and authorization
2 parameters, etc.) Unlike the above scenario, however, authorization server 12 might not send the
3 authorization material to terminal 20. When navigation system 16 then detects the presence of
4 the storage device 22, it may be programmed to responsively contact authorization server 12 via
5 link 14 (e.g., by placing a cellular telephone call to the authorization server) and to request the
6 authorization material. Authorization server 12 may then send the authorization material, and
7 navigation system 16 may use the authorization material to facilitate access to the database.

8 As still another variation of this alternative embodiment, link 14 may itself comprise
9 portable data storage device 22, which may be physically transported from authorization server
10 12 (or another entity) to navigation system 16. In this arrangement, for instance, authorization
11 server 12 may record onto storage device 22 all of the information that terminal 20 would have
12 recorded onto the storage device in the embodiments described above and then provide the
13 storage device for use in navigation system 16.

14 In this variation, for instance, a user may order a particular set of geographic data from a
15 data provider, such as via the Internet or via a call center. The data provider may obtain the user
16 ID, navigation system ID and other information (such as the information that terminal 20 would
17 obtain in the embodiments described above) and then employ the authorization server to generate
18 and record onto a storage device 22 the requested data set. The data provider may then ship or
19 otherwise transport the loaded storage device 22 to the user for use by the navigation system as
20 described above.

21 **F. Conclusion**

22 Examples of the present invention have been described above. Those skilled in the art will
23 understand, however, that changes and modifications may be made in these embodiments without

1 departing from the true scope and spirit of the present invention, which is defined by the following
2 claims.

3 For example, where the above description notes that certain logic functions may be
4 carried out by a processor executing software instructions, those functions can equally be
5 employed through hardware, firmware, or a combination of hardware, firmware and software if
6 desired.

7 As another example, while the foregoing description has focused on securing geographic
8 data and providing geographic data for use by a navigation system, the elements, systems and
9 processes described can be equally employed to secure and communicate other types of data for
10 use in other contexts. Examples of such other data include those described in the background
11 section (e.g., data for music players or video players (such as songs or movies), data for video
12 game consoles (such as games, etc.), as well as other sorts of data now known or later developed.

CLAIMS

I claim:

1. A method of securely conveying a data product, the method comprising the steps of:

establishing an authorization key that defines (i) verification information indicative of at least one authorized entity and (ii) a cryptographic key to the data product;

encrypting the authorization key, thereby producing an encrypted authorization key that can be decrypted using a decryption key; and

providing the encrypted authorization key to a system that (i) has access to the decryption key and can therefore decrypt the encrypted authorization key and (ii) is programmed to decrypt the authorization key and to use the verification information to validate use of the data product.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:

receiving the encrypted authorization key;

using the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted authorization key, and thereby uncovering the verification information and the cryptographic key to the data product; and

using the verification information to validate use of the data product.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein using the verification information to validate use of the data product comprises comparing at least a portion of the verification information to predetermined information associated with the system, to determine whether the system is authorized to use the data product.

1 4. The method of claim 3, wherein the predetermined information associated with
2 the system comprises a system ID.
3

1 5. The method of claim 1, wherein providing the encrypted authorization key to the
2 system comprises sending the encrypted authorization key to the system via a wireless
3 communications network.
4

1 6. The method of claim 1, wherein providing the encrypted authorization key to the
2 system comprises recording the encrypted authorization key on a data storage medium and then
3 providing the data storage medium to the system.
4

1 7. The method of claim 6, further comprising the steps of:
2 the system reading the encrypted authorization key from the data storage medium;
3 the system using the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted authorization key and
4 thereby uncovering the verification information and the cryptographic key to the data product;
5 and
6 the system using the verification information to validate use of the data product.
7

1 8. The method of claim 7, wherein using the verification information to validate use
2 of the data product comprises comparing at least a portion of the verification information to
3 predetermined information associated with the data storage medium, to determine whether the
4 data storage medium is authorized to store the data product.
5

1 9. The method of claim 8, wherein the predetermined information associated with
2 the data storage medium comprises a data storage medium ID.
3

1 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the data product comprises a database of
2 geographic information.
3

1 11. A method of securely conveying data, the method comprising the steps of:
2 assembling a set of authorization parameters associated with the data;
3 computing a first checksum of the set of authorization parameters;
4 generating a first cryptographic key substantially randomly;
5 using the first cryptographic key to symmetrically encrypt the set of authorization
6 parameters, so as to produce an encrypted set of authorization parameters;
7 encrypting a combination of the first cryptographic key and the first checksum, so as to
8 produce a header value that can be decrypted using a second cryptographic key; and
9 providing the header value, together with the data, for access by a receiving end.
10

1 12. The method of claim 11, further comprising the following steps performed at the
2 receiving end:
3 using the second cryptographic key to decrypt the header value, so as to produce an
4 decrypted header value;
5 retrieving the first cryptographic key and first checksum from the decrypted header value;
6 using the first cryptographic key to decrypt the encrypted set of authorization parameters;
7 computing a second checksum of the set of authorization parameters;

8 comparing the second checksum with the first checksum, and refusing to access the data
9 if the second checksum does not match the first checksum; and
10 using the set of authorization parameters to verify authorization to access the data.
11

1 13. The method of claim 12, further comprising encrypting the data before providing
2 the data and header value for access by the receiving end.
3

1 14. A method of securely conveying data, the method comprising the steps of:
2 assembling an authorization key that includes verification information indicative of a data
3 storage medium on which the data is authorized to be stored; and

4 encrypting the authorization key and the data, thereby producing an encrypted
5 authorization key and encrypted data;

6 storing the encrypted authorization key and encrypted data on a given data storage
7 medium; and

8 thereafter providing the given data storage medium to a system that is programmed to
9 decrypt the authorization key and to determine, by reference to the verification information
10 whether the given storage medium is the data storage medium on which the data is authorized to
11 be stored.
12

1 15. The method of claim 14, further comprising the system decrypting the encrypted
2 data only if the verification information indicates that the given storage medium is the data
3 storage medium on which the date is authorized to be stored.
4

1 16. A method of securely communicating a data product, while allowing the data
2 product to be used in connection with at least one authorized entity, the at least one authorized
3 entity having an associated identification code, the method comprising:

4 symmetrically encrypting at least a portion of the data product using a first cryptographic
5 key, thereby producing an encrypted portion of the data product that can be symmetrically
6 decrypted using the first cryptographic key;

7 establishing an authorization key including verification information;

8 computing a first value as a first function of input parameters including (i) the
9 identification code and (ii) a second value;

10 combining the first value with the first cryptographic key to produce a third value;

11 adding the third value to the authorization key;

12 thereafter using the first value as a second cryptographic key to symmetrically encrypt
13 the authorization key, so as to produce an encrypted authorization key that can be decrypted
14 using the first value;

15 encrypting at least the second value to produce an encrypted value that can be decrypted
16 using a third cryptographic key; and

17 providing to a receiving-end at least (i) the encrypted value, (ii) the encrypted
18 authorization key, and (iii) the encrypted portion of the data product,

19 whereby, if the receiving end has access to the third cryptographic key and the input
20 parameters, the receiving end may be able to uncover the first authorization key and the
21 cryptographic key and may therefore be able to access the verification information and decrypt
22 the encrypted portion of the data product.

1 17. The method of claim 16, wherein the data product comprises geographical
2 information, the authorized entity comprises a navigation system, and the identification code
3 comprises a navigation system ID.

1 18. The method of claim 16, wherein the data product comprises geographical
2 information, the authorized entity comprises a data storage device, and the identification code
3 comprises a storage device ID.

1 19. The method of claim 16, wherein the first function comprises a hash function.

1 20. The method of claim 19, wherein the input parameters further include a
2 predetermined segment of the encrypted portion of the data product.

1 21. The method of claim 16, wherein combining the first value with the first
2 cryptographic key to produce a third value comprises computing an XOR sum of the first value
3 and the first cryptographic key.

1 22. The method of claim 16, wherein encrypting at least the second value to produce
2 an encrypted value that can be decrypted with a third cryptographic key comprises:

3 combining the second value with a checksum of the authorization key; and

4 using a public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the second value

1 23. The method of claim 16, further comprising the following steps:
2 receiving at the receiving-end (i) the encrypted value, (ii) the encrypted authorization
3 key, and (iii) the encrypted portion of the data product,
4 using the third cryptographic key to decrypt the encrypted value
5 computing the first value as the first function of the input parameters;
6 using the first value as the second cryptographic key to symmetrically decrypt the
7 encrypted authorization key;
8 extracting the third value from the authorization key;
9 using the third value and the first value to generate the first cryptographic key; and
10 using the first cryptographic key to symmetrically decrypt the encrypted portion of the
11 data product.

1 24. Th method of claim 23, further comprising, at the receiving-end, verifying the
2 checksum of the authorization key.

1 25. The method of claim 23, wherein using the third value and the first value to
2 generate the first cryptographic key comprises computing an XOR sum of the third value and the
3 first value.

1 26. The method of claim 23, further comprising the step of validating use of the data
2 product by reference to the verification information.

1 27. A method of securing a data product against unauthorized use, while allowing the
2 data product to be used in connection with at least one authorized entity, the at least one
3 authorized entity having an associated identification code, the method comprising:

4 symmetrically encrypting at least a portion of the data product using a first cryptographic
5 key, thereby producing an encrypted portion of the data product that can be symmetrically
6 decrypted using the first cryptographic key;

7 establishing an authorization key including verification information;

8 computing a first value as a first function of input parameters including (i) the
9 identification code and (ii) a second value;

10 combining the first value with the first cryptographic key to produce a third value;

11 adding the third value to the authorization key;

12 thereafter using the first value as a second cryptographic key to symmetrically encrypt
13 the authorization key, so as to produce an encrypted authorization key that can be decrypted
14 using the first value; and

15 encrypting at least the second value to produce an encrypted value that can be decrypted
16 using a third cryptographic key.

17
1 28. The method of claim 27, further comprising randomly generating the first
2 cryptographic key.

3
1 29. The method of claim 27, wherein the portion of the data product comprises the
2 entire database.

1 30. The method of claim 27, wherein the portion of the data product comprises
2 information required to understand contents of the data product.
3

1 31. The method of claim 30, wherein the information required to understand contents
2 of the data product is selected from the group consisting of (i) database decompression
3 information and (ii) pointers.
4

1 32. The method of claim 27, wherein the data product comprises geographic
2 information.
3

1 33. The method of claim 27, wherein the data product comprises geographic
2 information, the authorized entity comprises a navigation system, and the identification code
3 comprises a navigation system ID.
4

1 34. The method of claim 27, wherein the data product comprises geographic
2 information, the authorized entity comprises a data storage device, and the identification code
3 comprises a storage device ID.
4

1 35. The method of claim 27, wherein the first function comprises a hash function.
2

1 36. The method of claim 27, wherein the input parameters further include a
2 predetermined segment of the encrypted portion of the data product.
3


1 37. The method of claim 27, wherein combining the first value with the first
2 cryptographic key to produce a third value comprises computing an XOR sum of the first value
3 and the first cryptographic key.

1 38. The method of claim 27, wherein encrypting at least the second value to produce
2 an encrypted value that can be decrypted with a third cryptographic key comprises:
3 combining the second value with a checksum of the authorization key; and
4 using a public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the second value

1 39. A system for securing a data product against unauthorized use, while allowing the
2 data product to be used in connection with at least one authorized entity, the system comprising:
3 a processor;
4 a data storage medium; and
5 a set of machine language instructions stored in the data storage medium and executable
6 by the processor to carry out the method steps of claim 27.

ABSTRACT

1
2 A method and system for securing a data product for mass distribution. An authorization
3 server may encrypt a portion of a data product. Further, the authorization server may assemble
4 an authorization key that includes information indicative of an entity authorized to store the data
5 product, and the authorization server may encrypt the authorization key. To encrypt the
6 authorization key, the authorization server may apply a symmetric encryption algorithm based on
7 a cryptographic key that is derived as a function of an identification code associated with the
8 authorized entity. The encrypted portion of the data product, the encrypted authentication key,
9 and the remainder of the data product may then be stored on the authorized entity, which may be
10 provided to a machine authorized to access the data product. The machine is preferably
11 programmed to derive the second decryption key, use it to decrypt the authentication key, and
12 then use the authentication key to validate use of the data product. Advantageously, if the data
13 product is copied to an unauthorized entity and that entity is then provided to the machine, the
14 machine may be unable to obtain the necessary identification code and may therefore be unable
15 to derive the cryptographic key, to decrypt the authentication key, or to validate access to the
16 data product.






Fig. 2




FIG. 3



1

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



Fig. 5



58

Fig. 6




Fig. 7




Fig. 8






Fig. 10








Fig. 12




Fig. 13

DECLARATION FOR PATENT APPLICATION

As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that:

My residence, post office address and citizenship are as stated below next to my name.

I believe I am the original, first and sole inventor (if only one name is listed below) or an original, first and joint inventor (if plural names are listed below) of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled, ENCRYPTION METHOD FOR DISTRIBUTION OF DATA, the specification of which:

- ☒ is attached hereto.
- ☐ was filed on _____ as Application Serial No. _____.
- ☐ and was amended on _____ (if applicable).

I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above-identified specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment referred to above.

I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to the patentability as defined in Title 37, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1.56(a).

I hereby claim foreign priority benefits under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or § 365(b) of any foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate or § 365(a) of any PCT International application which designated at least one country other than the United States, listed below and have also identified below, by checking the box, any foreign application for patent or inventor's certificate, or PCT International application having a filing date before that of the application on which priority is claimed:

Prior Foreign Application(s)

Priority Claimed

(Number)

(Country)

(Day/Month/Year Filed)

☐

☐

Yes

No

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) of any United States provisional application(s) listed below:

(Application Serial No.)

(Filing Date)

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 120 of any United States application(s), or § 365(c) of any PCT International application designating the United States, listed below and, insofar as the subject matter of each of the claims of this application is not disclosed in the prior United States or PCT International application in the manner provided by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR § 1.56 which became available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT International filing date of this application:

(Application Serial No.)

(Filing Date)

None

(Status-patented, pending, abandoned)

As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following registered practitioners to prosecute said patent application and to transact all business in the Patent and Trademark Office connected therewith:

Frank J. Kozak (Reg. No. 32,908)

Lawrence M. Kaplan (Reg. No. 33,521)

Direct all correspondence for the above-identified application and telephone calls to:

FRANK J. KOZAK

Chief Patent Counsel

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10400 West Higgins Road


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I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

Inventor's Signature
Full name of sole or first inventor
Residence
Citizenship
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